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Traditional PCC architectures center their certificate generation 
mechanisms on the output of the compilation. Along the lines of recent 
projects, we believe that there are strong benefits in moving the certificate 
generation to the source code level. Because there exist good tools for 
source code verification and for formal verification in general, it is a 
feature of the Lissom platform that existing tools are used as much as 
possible at key points of its infrastructure.
Our vision of PCC is based on the following two underlying principles:
• Source level PCC is the way. It is our belief that the realistic formal 
verification of mobile code should be performed at source level.
Programmers may be unaware of the target architecture details, 
and in general algorithmic constructions are expressed at source
level.
• Reuse as much as possible. There exist plenty of powerful tools for 
the formal verification of source code. Such tools already have 
experienced user communities, and have reached an appreciable 
level of maturity and flexibility that make them natural choices in the 
context of a source level PCC architecture. 
Started as a challenge for final year Computing students, Lissom was 
thought as a mean to prove to a skeptic community, and in particular to 
students, that formal verification tools can be put to practice in a realistic 
environment, and be used to solve complex and concrete problems. The 
attractiveness of the problems that PCC addresses has already brought 
students to show interest in this project. Aside this context, our main goal 
with Lissom is to get experienced with PCC and to put it into practice.
After the present prototyping phase, the platform must have proved to be 
adequate for mobile code security. The relevance and conceptual solidity 
of previous works on formal verification (e.g. [2]) on which this is based 
lead us to believe in the success of the enterprise.
Our road-map is the following, where the points highlighted as in progress
are the modules which are currently in active development.
1.To design an annotation language for Liss (in progress);
2.To extend the why tool to contemplate this annotation language, 
allowing to use why as a generator of proof obligations for source 
code (in progress);
3.To design a proof system for the Liss language, integrated in Coq
(starting phase);
4.To extend the Liss compiler with the capability to translate 
certificates (starting phase);
5.To design a proof system for the virtual machine and its language, 
integrated in Coq (in progress);
6.To design a proof obligation generator for compiled code (in 
progress).
We finish with a few examples of the many interesting problems that will 
be raised in this work, along with the classical challenges that every PCC 
platform must address. A first problem is the automation of the COQ 
proof process and its impact on the consumer effort; the tension between 
expressiveness and automation is a well-known problem that must be 
carefully studied. It also remains to see to what extent the techniques 
presented in [7] allow for conciseness of COQ certificates. The language 
Liss and the virtual machine used are non-trivial, but are still relatively 
simple when compared to platforms such as JAVA or .NET. The capacity 
of the platform to scale up to such platforms must thus be evaluated. 
Finally, it will be important to apply our choices in an appropriate case 
study that starts from the security policy specification to the certificate 
verification (proof of concept)
Future Work and Directions
• Short and mid term objectives: Lissom is at an early development 
stage we must conclude the implementation and test the Lissom
platform. 
This will include:  the LISS Certificate Translation Compiler, 
narrowing and automatizing the use of the proof system and the 
VCGen to a specific class of security policies.
• Long term objective:
Deployment of a source level PCC architecture for constrained 
embedded systems.
Due to high security concerns:
• embedded code execution schemes are very constrained. For 
instance:  no dynamic facilities, heavy resources (memory, 
etc...) confinement, no firmware/software updates, In general 
one purpose induces one dedicated architecture.
• Embedded software development models usually rely on 
software components outsourcing and contractors have 
difficulties to perform safe integration of the outsourced 
software components
In this context, Safety mechanisms based on verifiable evidences
(certificates) potentially will: 
• ease the distributed development model (e.g. safe 
outsourcing: outsourced code comes with evidences that it 
does not contain flaws identified by the contractor);
• give rise to a new embedded software paradigm. Safety 
certificates allow new execution scheme where, for instance, 
(a) a program can provide static evidences that it will not use 
unsafe operations or resources ;(b) two applications can 
safely cohabit in a embedded system.
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Proposed Architecture
The Source Language and the Compiler. LISS (Language for 
Integers Sets and Sequences) is a non-trivial toy language that 
also features a realistic type system (with e.g. sets, vectors a la 
Java, etc.) and high-level constructs. LISS is intended here as a 
suitable test-bed before aiming at an industrial-level language.
This language must be extended in order to provide an 
annotation system for the source code. In a source level PCC 
architecture, the compiler has to compile source code but also 
proofs into their machine level counterpart. A very interesting 
challenge is to transform a source level structural proof (proofs 
heavily rely on the structure of the analyzed program) into a proof 
that is still structurally close to the machine level code. We follow 
here the contributions of [1]).
The Virtual Machine. Lissom uses a sequential, stack-based 
virtual machine, which despite its simplicity has the capacity to 
support real languages (such as C or Java), and is, together with 
LISS, a suitable test-bed. The machine is an adaptation of
Filliâtre’s original virtual machine[4], used for teaching several 
Courses at our universities (e.g. Compiler Construction and 
Formal Methods). 
The Proof System and the Proof Checker. As far as the Trusted 
Computing Base (TCB) is concerned, it is important for it to be as small 
and solid as possible; we believe that an adequate choice of proof 
system may help attaining such a goal. Also, it is important to be able to 
express high level polices as well as lower level ones. 
These requirements have led us to consider using the COQ proof 
system and its higher-order specification language and underlying proof 
mechanisms. This system, based on the calculus of inductive 
constructions, has been used with success for the formal verification of 
critical and large-scale systems. Asfar as source code is concerned, 
integration with COQ is guaranteed by the existence of a numberof tools
suited for code annotation and proof (e.g. [6]). Lissom will feature a 
source code verification system based on Why and the COQ system. 
Thus we intend to use COQ proof objects as certificates.
The Verification Condition Generator. This will be obtained using 
Filliatre’s WHY tool [5], which is capable of producing proof obligations 
for various systems, including COQ. We are presently working on a 
WHY module for the language LISS (equivalent to Caduceus for C[6]) 
and for the input language of the virtual machine. The annotation 
language used for this will be an adaptation of JML[3] specialized for the 
security policy specification.
